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Energy consumptionAbstract Despite the great efforts to secure wireless sensor network (WSN), the dynamic nature and
the limited resources of sensor nodes make searching for a secure and optimal network structure an
open challenge. In this paper, we propose a novel encryption schema based on Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography (ECC) and homomorphic encryption to secure data transmission in WSN. The proposed
encryption schema is built upon GASONeC algorithm (Elhoseny et al., 2014) that uses genetic algo-
rithm to build the optimum network structure in the form of clusters. ECC is used to exchange public
and private keys due to its ability to provide high security with small key size. The proposed encryp-
tion key is 176-bit and is produced by combining the ECC key, node identification number, and dis-
tance to its cluster head (CH). To reduce energy consumption of CH, homomorphic encryption is
used to allow CH to aggregate the encrypted data without having to decrypt them. We demonstrated
that the proposedmethod is capable to work with different sensing environments that need to capture
text data as well as images. Compared with the state-of-the-art methods, our experimental results
demonstrated that our proposed method greatly improve the network performance in terms of life-
time, communication overhead, memory requirements, and energy consumption.
 2015 The Authors. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University. This is
an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Forming sensor clusters is an effective way to improve scalabil-
ity and longevity of wireless sensor network (WSN) (Li et al.,
2013). However, security is a challenging issue in cluster-based
WSNs, since sensors are usually deployed in unattended
environments. Moreover, limited memory, processing power,
and communication range of sensor nodes (SNs) make
traditional cryptographic schemes infeasible. In addition,
Secure data routing schema for WSN 263cluster heads (CHs) are usually responsible for data
aggregation and consume more energy than the member
nodes, which cause early termination from energy exhaustion.
Furthermore, data decryption and encryption to ensure secure
transmission demand more computation and hence shorten the
network life.
To address these challenges, many methods have been
developed to ensure security in WSN such as dynamic key
change, complexity, CH election criteria, etc. (Ganesh and
Amutha, 2013; Huang et al., 2014). Xiao et al. proposed
SLEACH (Xiao et al., 2005) to build a secure clustering model
for WSN. It aims to prevent sinkhole, selective forwarding,
and HELLO flooding attacks. However, conventional
encryption-based methods in general and SLEACH in partic-
ular are constrained by the memory size and faces degradation
of network performance and shortening of its lifetime. To
overcome the complexity of conventional encryption schemes
in terms of storage space in WSN, Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-
phy is used for its ability to provide high security with short
key size. In addition, the homomorphic encryption schema
(Zhou et al., 2014) is used to allow CHs to aggregate encrypted
messages without a decryption process so that it has a short
aggregation delay. Moreover, it prevents the attackers from
gaining knowledge of data or the encryption information even
if a CH is compromised. TinyPEDS (Girao et al., 2007) was
proposed as a method for secure data aggregation at the
CHs using privacy homomorphic encryption. Yet, this method
is vulnerable to node compromise attacks (Zhou et al., 2014).
Similarly, SEDA-ECC (Zhou et al., 2014) was developed fol-
lowing the principles of homomorphic encryption achieving
improved results. However, the limited memory size and
greater demand of energy consumption remain challenges for
bringing security to WSN.
In this paper, we propose an encryption schema based on
ECC and homomorphic encryption to secure data transmis-
sion in WSN with dynamically clustered sensor nodes. With
the goal of introducing minimum impact to the lifespan of
the entire network, genetic algorithm is employed to search
for the most suitable sensor nodes as the cluster heads to relay
messages to the base station. ECC is used to generate public
and private keys for sensor nodes. The encryption key at each
sensor node is of 176 bits and is produced by combining the
ECC key, identification number, and distance to its CH. To
reduce energy consumption of cluster head and cluster head
compromised attack, homomorphic encryption is used to
allow each CH to aggregate the encrypted data of its member
nodes without a decryption process. The proposed Encryption
method is built upon GASONeC algorithm (Elhoseny et al.,
2014) which uses Genetic Algorithm (GA) to determine the
optimum network structure that reduces the energy exhaustion
after each transmission round. GASONeC is briefly explained
at Section 4
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 clarify the main objectives and the novel
contributions of this work. Section 3 presents the related
work of secure WSN that achieves extended network life and
avoid attacks to WSN. Section 4 discusses our proposed
method to secure data transmission in dynamic clustered sen-
sors in WSN. Section 5 discusses our experimental results and
the contribution. Section 6 concludes this paper with a
summary.2. Objectives and contributions
The limited resources of WSN enforce most of researchers to
trade off between the network availability and data transmis-
sion security. Although many attempts were done to balance
between these two goals, the dynamic nature of WSN and
the limited resources of sensor nodes make searching for a
secure and optimal network structure an open challenge. Based
on that, this work has two main objectives. The first objective
is to build a dynamic and a self-organizing WSN structure that
maximizes the network longevity as long as possible by balanc-
ing the energy consumption between all nodes during the net-
work lifetime. The second objective is to secure the data
transmission process from sensor nodes to the base station tak-
ing into consideration the network lifetime.
The contributions of this work is three-fold. First, a
dynamic and optimal network construct is obtained by GASO-
Nec using genetic Algorithm and a new cryptography scheme
based on ECC and homomorphic encryption is applied for
secure data transmitting from sensor nodes to the base station.
The new scheme aims to achieve balanced energy consumption
across all nodes to prevent the high energy consumption of the
CH through data aggregation process. The main advantage of
the proposed scheme is its ability to deal with limited sensor
resources, i.e., memory size and processing power.
Second, the encryption method can be used for both text
and image data encryption. This method aims to be applied
with different sensing environments that need to capture text
data as well as images.
Third, the data aggregation method enables the cluster
head to aggregate the encrypted data without decrypting first
and re-encrypting to avoid CH energy consumption. This pro-
cess is executed using Homomorphic encryption and can resist
the attack of cluster head capture.3. Related work
SLEACH (Xiao et al., 2005) protocol is the first attempt to
build a secure version of the widely used LEACH protocol.
It is prevents sinkhole, selective forwarding and HELLO flood-
ing attacks. SLEACH prevents an intruder node to send falsi-
fied data messages. But it ensures no guarantee to
confidentiality and availability. Based on SLEACH,
SecLEACH (Oliveira et al., 2007) was proposed as an
improvement to introduce a symmetric key and one-way hash
chain. The main aim of that is to provide different perfor-
mance numbers on efficiency and security depending on its
various parameter values. Although it provides authenticity,
confidentiality, integrity and freshness for node-to-node com-
munication, SecLEACH did not provide a solution for the
compromised CH attack. This is because SecLEACH is vul-
nerable to key collision attacks and do not provide full connec-
tivity. Furthermore, TinyPEDS (Girao et al., 2007) was
proposed as a novel scheme for secure data aggregation at
the CH based on privacy homomorphic encryption. However,
this schema cannot resist node compromise attacks (Zhou
et al., 2014).
SEDA-ECC (Zhou et al., 2014) was proposed as a Secure-
Enhanced Data Aggregation based on Elliptic Curve Cryptog-
raphy. Similar to TinyPEDS, the design of SEDA-ECC is
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The security results of this method are better than TinyPEDS
especially in node compromise attack. But, the required mem-
ory size and the energy consumption represent the main chal-
lenges. Another method based on the identity digital signature
(IBS) scheme called SET-IBS (Huang et al., 2014) was pro-
posed for secure and efficient data transmission for cluster
based WSN. In SET-IBS, security relies on the hardness of
the Diffie–Hellman problem in the pairing domain. It provides
a good solution for both active and passive attacks but the net-
work lifetime still represents the main problem. Due to large
computational overhead of the asymmetric cryptography,
BGN (Boneh et al., 2005) was constructed on a cyclic group
of elliptic curve point. In (Mykletun et al., 2006), several
public-key-based encryptions schemes, i.e., EC-OU, were pro-
posed to achieve data concealment in WSNs. A Well-known
encryption schema is the Advanced Encryption System
(AES). This algorithm is based on block cipher encryption.
It has a fixed block size of 128 bits and has a key size of
128, 192, or 256 bits. However, AES running on 10, 12, and
14 rounds for 128-, 192-, and 256-bit key respectively is still
found vulnerable by the researchers (Bogdanov et al., 2011).
In addition, AES is not suitable for WSNs as it needs more
hardware resources (XiaoJun et al., 2012).
Another widely used block cipher schema in WSN is Skip-
jack (Eryilmaz et al., 2009). It uses an 80-bit key to encrypt or
decrypt 64-bit data blocks. This makes it vulnerable to the key
search attack due to the short key length (Biham et al., 2005).
However, the strategy is the main challenge of SkipJack in
WSNs. To avoid the short key problem of Skipjack, TWINE
(Suzaki et al., 2013) uses an 80 bit or 128 bit key. The best
known attacks against TWINE are two biclique attacks with
a data requirement for the two attacks equal to 260
(Karakoca et al., 2013). Based on lightweight block cipher
schema, LED (Isobe and Shibutani, 2012) was proposed to
encrypt 64 bit blocks using either 64 bit or 128 bit key. To gen-
erate the new key in LED, the key is XORed at every four
rounds. LED has two main limitations, it cannot prevent
man-in-the middle attack and consumes more CPU cycles
compared to conventional cryptographic schemes (Biswas
and Muthukkumarasamy, 2014).
BCC (Liu and Tian, 2012) is a block cipher that avoids
floating-point operations and multiplications in order to min-
imize the energy consumption. It is a flexible encryption
method that supports different number of rounds and length
of the encryption key. But, the authors failed to present any
security and performance analysis for it. In addition, an
encryption schema based on EEC and Chaotic Map was pro-
posed in Biswas and Muthukkumarasamy (2014). The pro-
posed cryptographic scheme employs elliptic curve points to
verify the communicating nodes and as one of the chaotic
map parameters to generate the pseudo-random bit sequence.
This sequence is used in XOR, mutation and crossover opera-
tions in order to encrypt the data blocks. However, the mem-
ory size is the big challenge of this schema. SecDAO-LEACH
(Saminathan and Karthik, 2013) was proposed to enhance the
WSN performance in terms of security, reliability and fault-
tolerance. This protocol is resistant to security attacks such
as, replay attacks, node compromising attacks and imperson-
ation attacks. In addition, it performs better in terms of energy
consumption. However, it suffers from the limited resources of
sensors specially the required memory size.EECBKM (Lalitha and Umarani, 2012) is a cluster based
technique for key management in which the clusters are
formed in the network and the CHs are selected based on
the energy cost, coverage and processing capacity. An EBS
key set is assigned by the base station to every CH and cluster
key to every cluster; this proposed technique reduces node-
capture attacks and efficiently increases packet delivery ratio
with reduced energy consumption. But the problem of this
protocol is that it works well in the environment with low den-
sity sensors. In addition, it suffers many kinds of active attack.
Another method is the SAC which is successful in preventing
attacks caused by adversary like hello flooding and provides
resilience to sensor nodes captured by adversary (Singh and
Hussain, 2010). PIKE uses probabilistic techniques to establish
pair wise keys between neighboring nodes in the network.
However, in this approach, each node has to store a large num-
ber of keys.
Another secure clustering algorithm is SCMRP (Kumar
and Jena, 2010) which is based on multi-path technique.
SCMRP collects the benefits of both cluster based routing
and multi-path routing. It provides security against various
attacks like altering the routing information, selective forward-
ing attack, sinkhole attack, wormhole attack, Sybil attack, etc.
In addition, it uses cryptography as a security mechanism to
protect message after portioning it to packets. SCMRP con-
sists of five phases: neighbor detection and topology construc-
tion, pairwise key distribution, cluster formation, data
transmission, and re-clustering and rerouting. The base station
collects all the neighbor list from sensor node and applies an
algorithm called DFS for finding multiple paths. The BS gen-
erates the pairwise key and unicasts to all nodes. The CH selec-
tion is based on the remaining energy of the node.
SHEER (Ibriq and Mahgoub, 2006) aims to create a secure
clustering schema with energy-efficient and secure communica-
tion on the network layer. SHEER uses the cryptography as
the security mechanism. It proposed a schema for key distribu-
tion based on the Hierarchical Key Establishment System
(HKES). SHEER proposed also a probabilistic transmission
mechanism to reduce energy consumption and extend the net-
work lifetime. This method works effectively against HELLO
flood attack, sybil attack and sinkhole attack. Its main draw-
back is that it is not able to protect the network from selective
forwarding attacks.
AKM (Kausar et al., 2008) is a cryptography-based method
that provided security by using two kinds of keys: a pair-wise
between the nodes inside the cluster, and a network key. This
algorithm provides multiple levels of encryption that work well
with secure cluster formation and avoid node captures. AKM
provides confidentiality, continuous authentication of nodes in
the network by periodically changing the network key. How-
ever, if the compromised node attached with the network
before refreshing the current network key, all the network
operations of can be monitored.
In IKDM (Cheng and Agrawal, 2007) each node has a
unique identifier (ID) in the network. It uses Pairwise key a
mechanism for cryptography. The node ID is assigned at the
initialization phase of the network by an offline Key Distribu-
tion Server (KDS). Then every node creates a pair-wise key
between them by exchanging their node IDs first. This method
provides better network throughput and fixed key storage
overhead and is suitable for large-scale WSNs. Therefore
IKDM scheme is more energy-efficient due to the lower
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key establishment process. Also, it can achieve better network
resilience against node capture attack.
4. Methodology
Fig. 1 shows the phases of our proposed work. The first phase
is related to constructing the network structure that minimizes
energy exhaustion using GASONeC algorithm. Then, the
proposed encryption schema is applied to guarantee secure
data routing from sensor nodes to the BS. These phases
are discussed in detail in the following.
4.1. Dynamic cluster building using GASONeC
GASONeC (Elhoseny et al., 2014) was proposed as a Genetic
Algorithm-based, clustering method that optimizes dynamic
node clustering to extend the network lifetime. In GASONeC,
the remaining energy, the expected energy expenditure, the dis-
tance to the base station, and the number of nodes in the vicin-
ity are employed to search for an optimal, dynamic network
structure. Balancing these factors is the key of organizing nodes
into appropriate clusters and designating a surrogate node as
cluster head. The factors are encoded into the fitness function
of Genetic Algorithm (GA). In the optimization process, each
GA chromosome represents a designation map of cluster
heads. A gene in a chromosome specifies if the corresponding
node serves as a cluster head. Given a cluster head, the node
clusters are then formed following the nearest neighbor rule,
and the fitness of a WSN structure prescribed by a chromo-
some is hence determined by the evaluation of all clusters. In
each transmission round, network structure is updated dynam-
ically to achieve network longevity. To ensure security in such a
dynamically clustered sensor network, the security protocol
must also take energy consumption into consideration.Fig. 1 General framework for creating our prFig. 2 shows the main steps of GASONeC work. First, a
binary chromosome is used to specify the cluster heads in
the network, in which one represents a cluster head and zero
represents a member node to a cluster. When a node becomes
inactive, i.e., out of power, its corresponding gene value is set
to 1, which exempts the node from further GA operations.
An example for the binary chromosome is shown in Fig. 3
and the cluster heads are highlighted with filled circles. The
dash arrows depict the cluster membership. The length of the
chromosome is determined by the number of sensor nodes in
the network field. To construct the network, distances between
non-CH nodes and CH nodes are calculated. The sensor nodes
are organized into clusters following the nearest neighbor rule.
So, each chromosome is translated to a network structure.
That is, a non-CH node s is assigned to a cluster if the CH
of that cluster is closer to s than any other CHs in the network.
The total distance to the CHs is hence minimized.
The third step is to use the fitness function to evaluate the
proposed network structure. The optimization goal is to min-
imize the remaining energy variation among nodes. The fitness
function includes a set of parameters as the remaining energyeE and the expected energy expenditure DE. In addition, the
distance to BS D and the number of neighbors Ne of a node
i are included to diversify the cluster structure. So, the fitness
function of a proposed network structure u is defined as
follows:
fðuÞ ¼
eE
NEð0Þ þ
E0
DE
þ 1
D
þNe ð1Þ
where E0 denotes the total energy cost if the messages are
transmitted directed from the sensor nodes to the BS. The
value of D is calculated as
D ¼
Xjchj
i¼1
dchi;BS ð2Þoposed secure data transmission algorithm.
Fig. 2 GASONeR consists of three steps: cluster heads election, clusters formation, and configuration evaluation. the arrows depict the
data flow.
Fig. 3 GA chromosome and the mapping to network clusters.
266 M. Elhoseny et al.The number of neighbors of a node i (donated by NðiÞ) is
the count of nodes that far from i by a distance d less than
or equal to h. Where the h value is estimated according to
the network area.
NðiÞ ¼ jnjj () dinj 6 h : ði – nj & h > 0Þ ð3Þ
So, the value of Ne is calculated as:
Ne ¼
Pjchj
i¼1NðiÞ
N
ð4Þ
In addition to fitness function, GASONeC calculates the
probability of select PðSiÞ, the expected count of select (EC),
and the actual count of select for each chromosome as shown
in Eq. (5):
pðsiÞ ¼ fðiÞPn
x¼1fðxÞ
ð5Þ
where n is the number of the chromosomes in the population.
A generation of the GA begins with reproduction. GASONeC
selects the mating pool of the next generation using the
weighted roulette wheel. The evolution terminates when one
of the following criteria is satisfied: (1) the maximum number
of generations is reached; or (2) the fitness converges. Uponcompletion of the GA evolution, the chromosome that gives
the best fitness value is used to restructure the nodes.
4.2. Key establishment and plaintext encryption
A new encryption key is created in each transmission round for
each sensor node. To overcome memory constraint, we
designed the encryption key of 176-bit that includes the follow-
ing components. The first component consists of 148 bits pro-
duced by the ECC and the ECC parameters are embedded in
the sensors. The second component of the key represents the
node ID in 13 bits. Although a typical size of a WSN is in
the range of 200 nodes in most practical applications (Huang
et al., 2014), a large scale WSN could consist of thousands
of nodes. Hence, we allocate 13 bits for the node ID that is able
to represent more than eight thousand sensors. The third com-
ponent consists of 15 bits to encode the distance between the
sensor and its CH Di;CH. The seed key at sensor node i is the
set to fKi; IDi;Di;CHg.
To minimize the network communication overload, the
authentication process is built upon the first part of the key.
The key establishment between a SN and the BS is a two-
party authentication process. The cluster heads (CHs) send
the hashed ECC key from the member nodes to the BS to ini-
tialize the transmission sessions. We assume that every node
knows its ID. The hashed code of the ECC key is produced
using SHA-2 hashing function (Zhou et al., 2014).
To be self-content, we briefly review ECC encryption.
Generally, an elliptic curve is a cubic equation with the
following form:
y2 ¼ x3 þ axþ b; ð6Þ
where a and b are integers that satisfy 4a3 þ 27b2 – 0. The first
step before data transmission between SNs, an elliptic curve
and a base point p that lies on the curve must be known for
every SN in the network. We assume that the elliptic curve
parameters as well as the base point p are preloaded in the
memory of each SN. To generate a shared secret key between
SN A to SN B;A chooses a random prime integer kA and B
chooses a random prime integer kB. kA and kB are the private
keys of A and B, respectively. After that, Eqs. (7) and (8) are
followed to generate the public keys kA and kB for A and B,
respectively.
Fig. 4 The proposed encryption scheme.
Fig. 5 The permutation result for the plaintext ‘cloud cloud’ using an encryption key with two parts p1 and p2.
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kB ¼ kB  p ð8Þ
The public keys of both A and B are curve points. The pri-
vate keys kA and kB specify the times of multiplying the base
point p by itself to generate the public keys. After sharing pub-
lic keys, they generate a shared secret key R, which needs to be
the first part of our proposed encryption key, by multiplying
public keys by their private keys as shown in Eq. (9). With
the known values of kB; kA, and p, it is computationally
intractable for an eavesdropper to calculate kA and kB which
are the private keys of A and B. As a result, adversaries cannot
figure out R which is the shared secret key (Houssain et al.,
2012).R ¼ kA  kB ¼ KB  kA ð9Þ
The SN uses the main operations of point addition and
point doubling of the elliptic curve to generate its public key.
The strength of an ECC crypto-system depends on the diffi-
culty of finding the number of times p is added to itself to
get this public key. This number represents the private key
of the SN. The multiplication operation can be executed by
adding a point along an elliptic curve to itself repeatedly.
The addition operation for any two points xðx1; y1Þ and
#ðx2; y2Þ over an elliptic curve is given by Eqs. (10), and (11)
with the assumption that xþ # is equal to a new point
hðx3; y3Þ.
x3 ¼ k2  x1  x2 ð10Þ
Fig. 6 The final result of the encryption process after applying the Concatenation operation using the count of ones in each 11-bits of p2.
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where k is calculated as the following:
k ¼
y2y1
x2x1 if x– #
3x2
1
þa
2y1
if x ¼ #
8<
:
Fig. 4 shows the main steps of the encryption process which
contains three different operations: XOR, permutation, and
concatenation. The processes M and CR denote permutation
and concatenation operations respectively. Permutation is a
process of changing one or multiple bit values in a given bit
string. Concatenation is a process of taking two parent bit
strings and producing corresponding child bit string by inter-
changing selected parts of bit strings between the parents.
The permutation process is applied to create random diversity
in the ciphertext, whereas the concatenation operation is used
to change the order of the mutated text or image data. The
main benefit of using these two operations is that they intro-
duce relatively fair diversity in the ciphertext.
Algorithm 1: Plaintext Encryption Process
1: Partition the plaintext into 88-bits N blocks
S ¼ fb1; b2; . . . ; bNg.
2: Generate the 176-bits bit sequence b
3: Divide b to two equal parts p1 and p2, 88-bits each
4: Calculate the count of 1’s for each byte X½x1;x2; . . . ; x8 as well
as count of 1’s for each 11 bits Y½y1; y2; . . . ; y8 in p2
5: for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;N do
6: d ¼ p1  bi
7: d ¼Perm {d;X½i}, where Perm is the permutation function.
8: a ¼Con {d;Y½i}, where Con is the concatenation function.
9: Cipher½i = a
10: end for
11: Return the ciphertext Cipher½c1; c2; c3; . . . ; cN, where ci is the
ciphertext of biAs shown in Algorithm 1, the working steps of the encryp-
tion process are as the following: First, we divide the bit
sequence into 176-bits blocks and each block is subdivided into
two 88-bit blocks. Then we calculate the number of 1s in each
byte as well as the number of 1s for each 11 consecutive bits in
the second half of the bit sequence. After that, we convert the
plaintext into their corresponding binary codes and group
them into blocks of 88-bits. This binary code is xored with
the first block of the bit sequence since the additive cipher
XOR is secure for the same length of key-stream. Then, the
permutation process is performed on each byte of xored plain-
text. For example, if the number of 1s in the first byte of the
second half of random bit sequence is 7, we mutate the 7th
and 8th number bits in the first byte of the xored plaintext.
The permuted plaintext is further concatenated as shown to
generate the ciphertext. This concatenation operation is done
repeatedly so that each of the 11 bits performs the operation
at least twice in order to add relatively fair diversity.
For example, Fig. 5 shows the result of permutation process
using the plaintext ’cloud cloud’ with assumption that the
encryption key parts are p1 and p2. To get the result of concate-
nation operation, the count of ones in each 11-bits of p2 is cal-
culated as (4 , 5 , 3 , 3 , 1 , 3 , 1, 3). Fig. 6 shows the final result
of the encryption process after applying the concatenation
operation.
4.3. Secure data aggregation
In cluster-based WSN, a CH consumes more energy than a SN
due to receiving, processing and retransmitting the data. This
phase aims to avoid energy consumption of CH by allowing
it to aggregate the encrypted data of their cluster members
without having to decrypt them. As a result, the attacker won’t
be able to eavesdrop on the data from intermediate nodes,
resulting in much stronger privacy than the traditional aggre-
gation schemes. To do that, we use the addition property of
Fig. 7 The transferred ciphertext from CH to BS.
Secure data routing schema for WSN 269the homomorphic encryption that allows arithmetic operations
to be performed on ciphertext.
For example, Let EðÞ denote encryption function. LetM be
a group of messages under operation  and C is a group of
messages under operation . EðÞ is a ð;Þ homomorphic
encryption function if for c1 = Ek1 (m1) and c2 = Ek2 (m2),
there exists a key k such that c1 c2 ¼ Ekðm1 m2Þ. In our
scheme, each sensor node Ni senses data mi, and encrypts it
with ki as shown in Eq.(12) and sends it to its CH. Where r
is the round index in which the node produced the key ki.
ci ¼ Eðmi; kri ;MÞ ¼ mi þ kri ðmodMÞ ð12Þ
After receiving the sensed data, the CH collects nmessages and
aggregates them by simply adding them up as shown in Eq.
(13):
c ¼
XjNj
i¼1
ci ¼
XjNj
i¼1
mi þ
XjNj
i¼1
kri ðmodMÞ ð13Þ
The last step after aggregating the data is to forward it to
the BS. In order to arrange the aggregated data, CH will attach
all node indexes at the end of the message. Thus, the last form
of the transferred ciphertext CT to BS will be as shown in
Fig. 7 with total size N  176þN  13 bits, where N is the
count of nodes in the cluster.
4.4. Plaintext retrieval process
Data decryption process aims to get back the original data that
has sent by every SN in the network. Thus, the BS has to do
two main processes to get the plaintext: data deaggregation,
and plaintext retrieval. As shown in Algorithm 1. there are
two main purposes of data deaggregation step. First, the BS
has to extract the IDs of the nodes away from the aggregated
ciphertext C. Since the cluster information is stored at the BS,
it knows the count of nodes inside the cluster and their IDs. As
explained in secure data aggregation phase, the BS will start
the separation process at index N  176 which represents the
end of the aggregated ciphertext. Second, the reverse process
of homomorphic encryption addition (Zhou et al., 2014) will
be used to get C1;C2; . . . and CN.
As soon as the BS separates the ciphertext, the plaintext
retrieval process will start. The BS will use the shared keys for-
ward by CH to decrypt the data and get the plaintext. The
decryption process will start by generating the cryptography
key for each SN. The working steps of the decryption process
that aims to extract the plaintext are as the following: Similarly
to the encryption process, BS divides the encryption key into
176-bit blocks and each block is subdivided into two 88-bit
blocks. Then it calculates the number of 1s in each byte x as
well as the sum of 1s for each 11 consecutive bits y in the sec-
ond half of the random bit sequence. After that, it converts theciphertext into their corresponding binary codes and groups
them into blocks of 88-bits. Then, the ciphertext will be con-
catenated with y to generate the permuted ciphertext. After
that, the permutation process is performed on each byte of
the ciphertext using x. For example, if the number of 1s in
the first byte of the second half of bit sequence is 7, BS per-
mutes the 7th and 8th number bits in the first byte of the
ciphertext. Finally, the BS will get the plaintext by X-Nored
the first 88-bit block of the bit sequence with the result of
the permutation process.
Algorithm 2: Ciphertext Decryption Process
1: By receiving ciphertext C with size b bits from CH x, get the
count of its cluster members N
2: g= the first ðN  176Þ bits of C, where g is the aggregated data.
3: l= C - g, where l is the cluster members’ IDs starting from bit
index ðN  176Þ þ 1 of C
4: g = Deaggr ðgÞ, where Deaggr is the deaggregation function
that revers the homomorphic operation
5: Ci ¼Assign {g;l}, where Ci is the ciphertext of SN i
6: for i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;N do
7: Partition Ci into 88-bits Q segments S ¼ fs1; s2; . . . ; sNg
8: Generate the 176-bits bit sequence b
9: Divide b to two equal parts p1 and p2, 88-bits each
10: Calculate the count of 1’s for each byte X½x1;x2; . . . ; x8 as
well as count of 1’s for each 11 bits Y½y1; y2; . . . ; y8 in p2
11: for j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;Q do
12: a = Con {d;Y½i}, where Con is the concatenation
function.
13: d = p1  sj
14: d = Perm {d;X½i}, where Perm is the permutation
function.
15: Plain½j = d
16: end for
17: Return the the plaintext Plain½m1;m2;m3; . . . ;mQ, where
mj is the plaintext of SNj
18: end for5. Experimental results and discussion
The performance of the system was measured using the system
throughput, network life time and the total energy consump-
tion. In addition, we provide description about how our new
schema prevents many kinds of attack to affect the network
nodes.
5.1. Experimental settings
Our proposed method is simulated using the same characteris-
tics of the sensor MICAz. The MICAz is based on the
low-power 8-bit microcontroller ATmega128L with a clock
frequency of 7.37 MHz and runs TinyOS as an event driven
operating system. It also embeds a IEEE 802.15.4 compliant
CC2420 transceiver with a claimed data rate of 250 kbps
(demeulenaer et al., 2008).
In this evaluation, the WSN has the following properties:
 There is one base station that receives data from nodes;
 Nodes are stationary and their positions are known;
Table 1 Network properties.
Properties Values
Number of Nodes 100
Initial node energy 0.5 J
Idle state energy 50 nJ/bit
Data aggregation energy 5 nJ/bit
Amplification energy dP d0 10 pJ=bit=m2
(cluster head to base station) d < d0 0:0013 pJ=bit=m2
Amplification energy dP d1 Efs=10 ¼ Efs1
(node to cluster head) d < d1 Emp=10 ¼ Emp1
Table 2 Correlation analysis between the adjacent pixels
(horizontal, vertical, diagonal, and anti-diagonal directions)
Input Image Horizontally Vertical Diagonal Anti-diagonal
Plain 0.9421 0.9513 0.8792 0.8968
Cipher 0.0018 0.0024 0.0052 0.0120
Table 3 Memory Requirements and CPU Cycles
Method CPU Time RAM ROM
(cycles) (ms) (bytes) (bytes)
SkipJack 91224 12.353 292 7218
AES 68512 9.287 324 6994
LED 589652 78.972 378 5970
TWINE 128896 17.477 384 5280
BCC 91286 12.547 976 6240
Biswas 62396 8.547 542 5326
Our Method 66201 8.619 281 3845
270 M. Elhoseny et al. Provided with sufficient energy, each node can directly
reach the base station;
 The characteristics and initial energy of each node are the
same.
Table 1 lists the network parameters used in these experi-
ments. In running GA to construct the network structure, we
use the population size of 30 for 30 generations. The crossover
probability and mutation probability are 0.8 and 0.006, respec-
tively. The neighborhood distance d is 20m throughout these
experiments when LSD is calculated.
The average performance of 10 repetitions is reported. In
each experiment, nodes are randomly placed in the field and
the base station is also randomly placed at a certain distance
to the field center. Comparison studies are conducted with dif-
ferent state-of-the-art methods to evaluate both security and
efficiency of the network.
5.2. Image encryption
To evaluate the performance of the proposed method in case
of images environment, we present the results of the histogram
analysis and correlation analysis of two adjacent pixels in
cipher images. First, the histograms of the plain image and
its corresponding cipher image are shown at Fig. 8. From
Fig. 8, it is noticeable that the histograms of the cipher and
the plain images are significantly different. This big difference
means that our proposed method avoids the statistical attack.
On the other hand, the correlation between adjacent pixels
in an image is an important evaluation criteria for any encryp-
tion algorithm. This correlation may be in horizontal, vertical
or diagonal directions. A secure encryption scheme should
produce low correlation in the adjacent pixels in the cipherFig. 8 Histograms of plain image and its corresponding cipher imag
image, (c) the cipher image and (d) histogram of the cipher image.image. To evaluate our proposed secure schema, the correla-
tion between two vertically adjacent pixels, two horizontally
adjacent pixels, two diagonally adjacent pixels, and two
anti-diagonally adjacent pixels in the plain and cipher images
is calculated. This evaluation is done by selecting 1500 pairs
of adjacent pixels from the plain image. Then, their correlation
coefficient is calculated using Eqs. (14)–(16).
covðx; yÞ ¼ 1
n
XN
i¼1
½Efðxi  EðxÞÞðyi  EðyÞÞg ð14Þ
rxy ¼ covðx; yÞﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
DðxÞ DðyÞp ð15Þ
where x and y are gray-levels of two adjacent pixels in the
image and rxy is the correlation coefficients between two hor-
izontally,vertically and diagonally adjacent pixels of these two
images.
DðxÞ ¼ 1
n
XN
i¼1
½ðxi  EðxÞÞ2 ð16Þ
Table 2 shows that there is a high correlation between the
adjacent pixels (horizontal, vertical, diagonal, and anti-
diagonal directions) in the plain image while the correlation
between the two adjacent pixels in the cipher image is very low.e. From left to right (a) the plain image, (b) histogram of the plain
Fig. 9 Ciphertext size of different methods.
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Operation speed determines time complexity and is a signifi-
cant factor for performance evaluation. Based on Biswas and
Muthukkumarasamy (2014), ATEMU is used to get the total
CPU cycles required to encrypt 32 byte data for MICA2 sensor
mote. To evaluate the required memory size for each algo-
rithm, TOSSIM has been used. Compared to state-of-the art
methods, the results in the table indicate that our proposed
algorithm performs better in terms of memory consumption
(both RAM and ROM) as shown in Table 3. In case of
CPU cycles, it can be seen that (Biswas and
Muthukkumarasamy, 2014) is more efficient than the
other protocols but still closed to our algorithm. Although
our algorithm uses more time compared to Biswas and
Muthukkumarasamy (2014), it is less than that of all other
methods. Overall the proposed algorithm performed signifi-
cantly better than other algorithms.Fig. 10 Network energy consum5.4. Communication overhead
The number of exchanged messages in each scheme is the same
as each node needs to send two messages during the transmis-
sion process one HELLO message to establish the connection,
and the other message for data transmission (Zhou et al.,
2014). Thus, the communication overhead mainly depends
on the ciphertext size of each algorithm if we assume that
the number of message sending to the BS is the same. Accord-
ing to Zhou et al. (2014), the ciphertext size of SEDA-ECC is
256-bit. While EC-OU’s ciphertext size is 341-bit, BGN’s
ciphertext size is 1,025-bit, and TinyPEDS’s ciphertext size is
328-bit. In addition, the ciphertext size of the proposed algo-
rithm in Biswas and Muthukkumarasamy (2014) is 256-bit.
Our proposed method produces ciphertext with 176-bit size.
Fig. 9 shows the comparison of ciphertext sizes. So, we can
conclude that, the communication overhead of our proposed
schema is better than other schemes.ption for different methods.
Table 4 Network energy consumption. Each column gives the percentage of the consumed energy for all sensor nodes at a specific
round.
Round Index 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200
SL-LEACH 0 7 13 22 48 52 74 97 100 100 100 100
SecLEACH 0 10 20 43 61 79 90 100 100 100 100 100
SET-IBS 0 6 10 15 20 45 63 76 93 100 100 100
Our Method 0 0 0.5 1 10 18 29 53 65 89 95 100
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To evaluate the proposed schema from the energy consump-
tion point of view, we compared it with SET-IBS, SL-Leach,
and SecLeach methods as shown in Fig. 10. We find the
proposed protocol has less power consumption and longestFig. 11 The remaining energy of all sensor nodes (a) at network tranetwork lifetime. Compared with our methods, the increase
of power consumption in the state-of-the art methods started
before 200 rounds with the loss of the first node as shown in
Table 4. As a result, the other nodes faced more load due to
the increase of power consumption which reduced the network
life. On the other hand, the proposed protocol lost the firstnsmission round 100 and (b) at network transmission round 1000.
Secure data routing schema for WSN 273node at time. This reduced the power consumption and
increased the network life time.
In order to evaluate the energy consumption, it is also inter-
esting to examine the remaining energy of the sensor nodes.
Ideally, we want to achieve the equal remaining energy in all
nodes. Fig. 4 illustrates the percentage of the remaining energy
of sensor nodes at transmission rounds of 100 and 1000.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the remaining energy are fairly
equal with some fluctuations. That is, as a consequence of
our proposed method, the variance among remaining energy
is quite low, which implies that the sensor nodes shared the
burden of relaying messages and, hence, elongated the overall
network life. (see Fig. 11)
Fig. 12shows the comparison between our proposed
method and the state-of-the art methods in terms of network
life time. In addition, Table 5 presents the percentage of live
sensor nodes throughout the life span of the WSN using
different methods. The number of round is the average of 10
experiments with random sensor node placement. As shown,
our proposed method yielded the largest number of rounds
when the first sensor node dies. It is clear that our proposed
method greatly extended the network life.5.6. Security analysis
We have tested our proposed encryption scheme against vari-
ous security attacks. Here, we describe some of the important
security analysis results including Passive attack analysis, key-
space analysis, and compromised CH attack analysis.
5.6.1. Passive attacks
In the proposed protocol, the sensed data are encrypted by
ECC and the homomorphic encryption algorithm which deals
with eavesdropping. Thus, the passive adversaries cannot
decrypt the eavesdropped message without the decryption
key. Based on Huang et al. (2014), properties of the proposed
schema settle the countermeasures to passive attacks.Fig. 12 Network lifetime figure that shows the percentage of the rem
at the corner of the field.5.6.2. Key space analysis
Key space size is determined by the total number of different
keys used in the encryption scheme. The key-space of a good
encryption algorithm should be large enough to make brute-
force attacks infeasible. In our proposed encryption scheme,
the set of secret parameters is {Ki; IDi;Di;CH}, where Ki is cal-
culated based on {xi; yi;A;B} which are the parameters of the
curve. Ki is represented in 148 bits and has the following range
Ki 2 ð1; 2148Þ; IDi 2 ð1; 213Þ, and Di;CH 2 ð1; 215Þ. Therefore, the
complete key-space of the proposed encryption scheme is
3:4e38. Hence, we conclude that brute force attack is not feasi-
ble for such a large key space.
5.6.3. Compromised CH attacks
Compromised CH attack is an attack that tries to aggregate
the data from all cluster nodes by deluding them that it is
working as a CH. The aim of this attack is to analyze data
and conclude specific information after receiving it. In our pro-
posed schema, the role of CH is to forward the encrypted data
from its cluster nodes and the BS without decrypting it. In
addition, our encryption process depends on many factors, i.
e, node location, and the distance between the node and its
CH; this combination will require any attacker to have all
information about the network operations and network topol-
ogy (to know the distance between node and CH), and the
secret key that is produced by ECC.
5.6.4. Sinkhole attack
Sinkhole attack adds a node to the network to capture all data
as if it was the BS. The Sinkhole node has a strong power radio
transmitter that allows it to provide a high-quality route by
transmitting with enough power to reach a wide area of the
network. In our method, the BS can detect the sinkhole attack
as soon as it occurs. The BS starts the detection process by
flooding the network with a request message containing the
IDs and public key of the affected nodes after each round.
The affected nodes reply to the base station with a messageaining number of live sensor nodes given the base station is placed
Table 5 Network life span. Each column gives the number of network transmission rounds when the respective percentage of sensor
nodes becomes unavailable due to depletion of energy.
Percentage of alive nodes 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
SL-LEACH 509 592 698 780 893 1004 1082 1204 1290 1354 1402
SecLEACH 306 450 490 542 601 764 814 901 976 1200 1300
SET-IBS 591 695 801 894 1005 1100 1203 1360 1473 1600 1790
Our Method 723 885 965 1060 1110 1202 1370 1530 1707 1830 2103
Our w/o Encryption 1496 1620 1773 1832 1907 2100 2305 2501 2780 3400 5150
274 M. Elhoseny et al.containing their IDs and the public keys. The received infor-
mation is then used from the base station to construct a net-
work flow graph for identifying the sinkhole. In other words,
this attack is prevented by our method as the network struc-
ture is dynamically changed after each round. In addition
the data are encrypted using a set of factors that are changed
after each round and it is difficult for sinkhole attacker to get
these parameters to retrieve the plaintext even if he can receive
the data.
5.6.5. HELLO flood attack
HELLO flood attack sends the HELLO packet to the nodes,
the node may assumes the attacked device as a neighbor that
tries to connect with it. It aims to consume the network
resources. In our method, the SN receives and transmits data
to its CH only. In addition, it knows the distance between it
and its CH after each round. So, we can conclude that the
Hello Flood attack can be detected and avoided by the SNs.
The same thing is applied in case of Selective Forwarding
attack that tries to put a malicious node to act as normal node
and drop the messages as soon as they receive it.
5.6.6. Denial of service attack
Also, the Denial of Service attack which sends unnecessary
packets and utilizes more network bandwidth to prevent the
user from accessing the service or resources is considered a
popular attack. This attack is avoided also by changing the
CH after each round and informing the CH with its cluster
members. So, there is no direct connection between a SN
and any other node except its CH which is well known by
the SN. In addition, the acknowledge message that is sent from
BS to the SN as soon as it receives the data will prevent this
attack.6. Conclusion
Forming network clusters is an effective way of improving
scalability and longevity of WSN. However, security is a chal-
lenging issue in Cluster-based WSNs, since sensors are usually
deployed with limited resources in unattended environments.
Despite the great efforts in secure clustering of WSN, the
dynamic nature of sensor network and numerous possible clus-
ter configurations make searching for a secure and optimal
network structure an open challenge. Due to its ability to pro-
vide high security with short key size, ECC is suitable for
implementations on the devices with limited resources as sen-
sor nodes in WSN. In this paper, we propose a novel
encryption schema based on ECC and homomorphic
encryption to secure data transmission in WSN with dynamicclustering nature. With the goal of optimizing the lifespan of
the entire network, genetic algorithm is employed to search
for the most suitable sensor nodes as the cluster heads to relay
the messages to base station. Then, ECC is used to generate
public and private keys for sensor nodes. The encryption key
at each sensor node is 176-bits and is produced by combining
the ECC key, identification number, and distance to its CH.
To prevent the CH energy consumption as well as CH
compromised attack, homomorphic encryption is used to
allow CH to aggregate the encrypted data of its cluster
members without having to decrypt them, to produce the final
message that will be sent to the base station. Thus, it prevents
the attacker from knowing anything even if the CH is compro-
mised, because CH is not responsible to encrypt messages.
Compared with other methods, our experimental results
demonstrated that our proposed method greatly improves
the network performance in terms of lifetime, communication
overhead, memory requirements, and energy consumption. In
addition, it prevents passive attack, CH compromised attack,
and brute force attack.
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